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Abstract 
We explore empirically the theoretical prediction that waves of optimism or pessimism may 
have aggregate effects, in the context of monetary policy. We investigate whether the 
sentiment conveyed by ECB and FOMC policymakers in their statements affect the term 
structure of private short-term interest rate expectations. First, we quantify central bank tone 
using a computational linguistics approach. Second, we identify sentiment as exogenous 
shocks to these quantitative measures using an augmented narrative approach following the 
information friction literature. Third, we estimate the impact of sentiment on private agents’ 
expectations about future short-term interest rates using a high-frequency methodology and 
an ARCH model. We find that sentiment shocks increase private interest rate expectations 
around maturities of one and two years. We also find that this effect is non-linear and 
depends on the state of the economy and on the characteristics (precision, sign and size) of 
the sentiment signal. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Cyclical fluctuations in macroeconomic activity and asset markets depend on beliefs about 
future outcomes. Pigou (1927) believed that business cycle fluctuations are driven by 
expectations and that entrepreneurs’ errors of optimism and pessimism are crucial 
determinants of these fluctuations. Keynes (1936) highlighted the importance of changes in 
expectations that are not necessarily driven by rational probabilistic calculations, but by what 
he labeled “animal spirits”. More recently, Angeletos and La’O (2013), Angeletos, Collard 
and Dellas (2015) and Benhabib, Wang and Wen (2015) have analysed how “sentiments” or 
“confidence” may drive business cycle fluctuations. Quantifying these unobservable 
concepts is important to understand how financial markets’ participants, firms and 
households form their expectations and make their decisions.  
 
This paper aims first to quantify these concepts of animal spirits, confidence, market 
sentiment or waves of optimism and pessimism in central bank communication, and second 
to explore empirically the theoretical prediction that sentiments, that are orthogonal to 
fundamentals and beliefs about fundamentals, may have aggregate effects, in the context of 
the euro area and US monetary policy.1 More specifically, we investigate whether the 
sentiment conveyed by European Central Bank (ECB) and Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) policymakers in their statements, quantified using computational linguistic 
methods, affect the term structure of private agents’ short-term interest rate expectations.  
 
Because long-term interest rates – a key determinant of private decisions – depend on 
expected short-term interest rates plus a term premium, central banks over the last decades 
have enhanced transparency of their actions and communication to the public in order to 
better signal future policy decisions, shape private expectations and optimise their policy 
outcomes (see e.g. Geraats, 2002; Woodford, 2005; King, Lu and Pasten, 2008, Reis, 2013). The 
question of whether central bank communication has been successful to affect financial 
markets or to help predict policy decisions has given rise to an abundant literature surveyed 
by Blinder et al. (2008). However, the question of its transmission mechanism and why 
central bank communication affects private beliefs remains a much more open question. 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) have shown the importance of information about the 
future policy path embedded in FOMC statements. Two usual candidates for the information 
revealed to private agents by central bank communication are signals about policymakers’ 
views about the current and future state of the economy and signals about their reaction 
function (which would include, for instance, the forward guidance policy and the 
commitment to deviate from a given policy rule). This paper explores another specific 
dimension: the sentiment conveyed by central bank communication, orthogonal to current or 
future policy and macroeconomic developments. 
 
The first empirical challenge for investigating central bank communication and for 
measuring such an intangible concept as central bank sentiment is to convert the policy 
statements into quantities that we can systematically analyse. The first contribution of this 
paper is to quantify the tone conveyed by ECB and FOMC statements using computational 
linguistic methods and more precisely dictionary methods.2 Their main advantages are 
                                                     
1 The question of the effect of the policymakers’ sentiment may also be raised in other contexts such as fiscal 
policy. For example, Frankel (2011) suggests that the over-optimism of official GDP and budget balance forecasts 
could be explained by the will of governments to boost consumer and business confidence. 
2 This central bank sentiment could potentially stem from monetary policy committee members’ subjective 
probabilities, non-nested information sets, risk aversion, cognitive bias, or even their press office. This question 
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automation and replicability. We use three different dictionaries that cover central banking, 
everyday and financial contexts, respectively the Apel and Blix-Grimaldi (2012)’s dictionary, 
the General Inquirer’s Harvard dictionary and the one developed by Loughran and 
McDonald (2011). Using dictionary methods, we also compute an ambiguity measure of 
policy statements. Many studies have coded indicators of the monetary policy stance 
conveyed by ECB or FOMC communications (see e.g. Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007, Hayo 
and Neuenkirch, 2010, or Hubert, 2016) and many studies in finance have computed market 
sentiment measures (see e.g. Tetlock, 2007, and Tetlock et al., 2008), but none has quantified 
the sentiment conveyed by monetary policymakers.3 The closest papers to ours are Lucca 
and Trebbi (2011), Hansen, McMahon and Prat (2015) and Hansen and McMahon (2016). The 
first paper uses computational linguistics to obtain semantic orientation between hawkish 
and dovish FOMC communications. However, while they use an automated lexicographic 
method, they focus on the policy stance content of central bank communication, which 
sentiment is supposed to be orthogonal to. The second paper uses probabilistic topic 
modelling that decomposes documents in terms of the fraction of time spent covering a 
variety of topics. They analyse how the internal deliberations during FOMC meetings have 
been affected by the release of FOMC transcripts after 1994. The third paper evaluates the 
tone associated to the different topics contained in FOMC statements and measures their 
effects on market and real economic variables. This paper aims to quantify whether there are 
such “waves of optimism and pessimism” independent from topics and fundamentals 
conveyed to the public by monetary policymakers; said differently, whether the choice and 
use of some specific words rather than some others to convey a given message matters. 
 
Our second contribution to the literature is to investigate whether this policymakers’ 
sentiment affects the term structure of private interest rate expectations, which are key to 
consumption and investment decisions. It requires overcoming a second empirical challenge. 
Our computed tone measure is endogenous to the business cycle, because the quantitative 
output of the computational linguistic method captures a combination of beliefs about the 
current and future state of the economy and sentiments. However, our analysis aims to focus 
on the effects of sentiments, distinct from fundamentals and expectations of future 
fundamentals, as formalised in the above-mentioned literature. To do so, we identify 
exogenous shocks to central bank tone to avoid any endogeneity bias and to comply with the 
assumption of Angeletos and La’O (2013) that sentiments are orthogonal to fundamentals. 
We follow the identification strategy of Romer and Romer (2004) augmented first so that 
exogenous shocks are not only orthogonal to the central bank’s information set but also to 
private agents’ information set and second by removing the contribution of past sentiment 
shocks following insights from the information frictions literature.  
 
We then use a high-frequency identification approach to isolate the effects of sentiment 
shocks from other-days events, controlling for the monetary shock happening the same day. 
We estimate the effect of sentiment on revisions in private beliefs about future policy, i.e. 
changes in private short-term interest rate expectations at maturities from 1 month to 10 
years ahead, measured with Overnight Indexed Swaps (OIS). As common with financial 
variables and because of evidence of “volatility clustering” (Mandelbrot, 1963), we use an 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model developed by Engle (1982) to 
properly account for the presence of heteroskedasticity. We also estimate the dynamic effects 
                                                                                                                                                                      
however is beyond the scope of this paper, which objective is to investigate whether such sentiment does exist 
and its effect on policy expectations. 
3 In sociology, Fligstein, Brundage and Schultz (2014) use computational linguistics on FOMC transcripts to 
measure sense-making of deliberations, while Acosta (2015) also uses computational linguistics on FOMC 
transcripts and minutes to analyze the FOMC’s responses to calls for transparency. 
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of sentiment using the local projections method of Jorda (2005). Finally, because the precision 
of the signal conveyed to the public would matter in a Bayesian updating model or because 
the sign, the size, the position in the business cycle, the level of inflation or the concomitant 
occurrence of a monetary policy shock could also potentially matter, we assess the non-linear 
effects of sentiment shocks.  
 
We find that positive shocks to sentiment increase private short-term interest rate 
expectations at horizons from 3 months to 10 years ahead in the euro area, and for horizons 1 
and 3 months ahead and from 1 to 3 years ahead in the Unites States. The peak effect in 
terms of magnitude and significance is around the 1 and 2 years maturity both in the euro 
area and in the United States. This effect is robust to the dictionary used for the 
quantification of tone measures, to an alternative identification of sentiment shocks using 
residuals of a Taylor rule, to alternatives estimation methods such as TARCH or OLS 
models, and to the parameter used for the high-frequency methodology: the window around 
policy statements and which days we look at in a control group. We also show that this effect 
is persistent. Finally, we find that the effect of sentiment is stronger when the precision of the 
signal conveyed is high (i.e. the ambiguity of central bank statements is low). The effect of 
sentiment shocks on private interest rate expectations also depends on their sign and size, as 
well as on the level of inflation, the business cycle and monetary shocks. The reaction of 
private agents to the sentiment conveyed by policymakers is signal- and state-dependent. 
 
These results give policymakers some insights on how private agents interpret and respond 
to the sentiment conveyed by central bank communication, that should be interpreted as 
optimism or pessimism signals beyond the policy decision and the central bank and private 
agents’ macroeconomic information set. Our results suggest that sentiment shocks matter for 
shaping private interest rate expectations and that the characteristics of sentiment and the 
timing when it is conveyed matters in that respect. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present the framework in Section 2 and the 
automated lexicographic methodology in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the financial and 
macro data. Section 5 is focused on the identification of exogenous sentiment shocks. In 
Section 6 we investigate the effect of sentiment. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Framework  
 
This section sets out our theoretical framework using insights from the literature to derive 
predictions about how private interest rate expectations might react to shocks to the 
sentiment conveyed by central bank statements. Angeletos and La’O (2013) develop a 
unique-equilibrium, rational-expectations, macroeconomic model which features “animal 
spirits” phenomenon, labelled sentiments. In standard macro models, these phenomena 
would be modelled as exogenous random shocks to preferences, endowments, technology or 
other fundamentals. However, shifts in sentiments or aggregate demand seem to appear 
without innovations in people’s preferences and abilities, or firms’ technologies. The 
literature has also analysed aggregate fluctuations as the result of “animal spirits” in models 
with multiple equilibria (see Farmer, 2012, or Benhabib, Wang and Wen, 2015) or as 
departures from rationality with a learning process (see Milani, 2014). 
 
Angeletos and La’O (2013) show that as long as information frictions prevent agents from 
reaching exactly the same expectations about economic activity, aggregate fluctuations in 
these expectations may be driven by a certain type of shocks which they call sentiments. 
These shocks are similar to sunspots but in unique-equilibrium economies, are modelled as 
5 
 
shifts in expectations of economic activity without shifts in the underlying preferences and 
technologies, and refer to any residual, payoff irrelevant, random variable. Angeletos and 
La’O (2013) split the economy into different “islands” following Lucas (1972) and “sentiment 
shocks” impact the information that is available to each island, without however affecting 
first-order beliefs about the aggregate fundamentals (which are fixed) or about the 
idiosyncratic fundamentals of its trading partner (which are random). These shocks impact 
equilibrium expectations, because they modify the equilibrium belief that each island forms 
about the decisions of other islands. One should consider a positive sentiment shock as a 
shock that rationalizes the optimism of one island by making this island receive a signal that 
other islands are themselves optimistic.4 The sentiment shock ξt is modelled as an exogenous 
random variable similar to a sunspot as it affects information sets without affecting the true 
aggregate fundamentals or any agent’s beliefs about fundamentals (for the latter being fixed 
and common knowledge). This variable introduces aggregate variation in beliefs of 
equilibrium outcomes without any variation in beliefs of fundamentals and is referred to as a 
sentiment shock.5 The sentiment shock ξt adds an aggregate noise component in the private 
signal that one island receives about another island’s information about its own 
characteristics, but ξt does not affect beliefs of either fundamentals. The main result is that 
aggregate output and the average expectation can vary with the sentiment shock ξt if and 
only if information is imperfect, and are increasing linear functions of ξt. 
 
Angeletos, Collard and Dellas (2015) have then quantified the importance of the variations in 
sentiment (or confidence) in macroeconomic DSGE models. They find that sentiment shocks 
lead to strong co-movement between employment, output, consumption and investment and 
that they account for around one half of GDP variance and one third of the nominal interest 
rate variance at business-cycle frequencies. 
 
We bring the issue of sentiment shocks to the data, by focusing on a specific fundamental: 
the short-term interest rate rt and the associated sentiment shocks ξt provided by a specific 
agent: the central bank, using computational lexicographic models to quantify this 
unobservable variable. In doing so, we need to respect two crucial assumptions described 
above: we need to take information frictions into account and sentiment shocks must be 
orthogonal to beliefs of fundamentals or “news shocks”, so to private agents’ and 
policymakers’ macroeconomic forecasts. 
 
3. Quantifying Central Bank Tone 
 
3.1. Central Bank Statements as a Source of Central Bank Tone 
 
To quantify the effect of central bank sentiment on interest rate anticipations, we first need to 
identify the main source through which central bank sentiment may happen and be 
disclosed to the public. In that respect, central bank statements that follow monetary policy 
decision meetings seem to be the most relevant candidate for three reasons. First, they 
                                                     
4 These shocks can also be understood as shocks to higher-order beliefs. By introducing trading frictions and 
imperfect communication, there can be higher-order uncertainty at the micro level: when two islands are matched 
together, they are uncertain, not only about each other’s productivities, but also about each other’s beliefs of their 
productivities, each other’s beliefs of their beliefs and so on. However, the authors prefer to interpret these 
sentiment shocks as shocks to first-order beliefs of endogenous economic outcomes, because agents only need to 
form first-order beliefs of the relevant equilibrium allocations and prices. 
5 This game-theoretic interpretation reveals an important connection between our micro-founded business-cycle 
economy and the class of more abstract coordination games studied by Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and 
Pavan (2007): it is as if the islands were trying to coordinate their production choices. 
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announce the policy decisions. Second, these statements act as a focal point for financial 
market participants, media, banks, monetary policy watchers and economists at the time 
when they are released, so these statements are made available to a large audience. They 
provide a detailed analysis of the central bank evaluation of the economic situation and of its 
assessment of risks to price and financial stability, and gives insights about the future likely 
policy path. These statements are cautiously prepared in advance, so their content is directly 
attributed to policymakers (see e.g. the analysis by Jansen and De Haan, 2009, about the use 
of the word “vigilance” by the former ECB Governor Jean-Claude Trichet). Third, the 
schedule and timing of these meetings are extremely precise and enable to accurately 
identify their effects on our variables of interest.  
 
ECB statements are published just before the monthly press conference explaining monetary 
policy decisions taken during the Governing Council meetings that happened earlier the 
same day, while FOMC statements are released at the end of the two-day FOMC meetings 
that are scheduled eight times a year. The ECB started to publish these statements in January 
1999 with a monthly frequency and the FOMC in 1996 with a low frequency, increasing to 
eight times a year in January 2000. Because of data availability constraints on our dependent 
variable – OIS – across maturities, our sample starts in August 2005 so estimates are 
comparable across the term structure. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for ECB and 
FOMC statements. Since August 2005, the ECB released 119 statements while the FOMC 
published 85 statements. On average, the ECB statements are usually three times longer (858 
words) than the FOMC ones (278).6 
 
Other types of communication could reveal central bank sentiment such as the minutes of 
the policy meetings like those of the FOMC or the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) at the 
Bank of England. Nevertheless, the FOMC minutes are available three weeks after the 
monetary policy meeting and their circulation is not as large and their objective is more 
about the accountability of decisions than to communicate with the public. Other 
interventions in the press, speeches at conferences or during political events like the 
testimony to the US congress may also convey central bank sentiment. But their frequency, 
audience and context make it more difficult to capture consistently and to give them the 
same weight than statements following monetary policy decisions.7 This choice means that 
we leave out Mario Draghi’s “Whatever it takes” for instance. One could however argue that 
this speech pronounced in London the 26 July 2012 is an outlier. Given these considerations, 
we consider ECB and FOMC statements to capture central bank sentiment.  
 
3.2. Measuring Tone with Dictionary Methods 
 
The development of machine learning algorithms by computer scientists for natural 
language processing opens up the possibility of handling large unstructured text databases 
so as quantify the content of raw text data (see for instance Blei et al., 2003). One advantage 
of the methods of this field is to be fully automated and replicable, which remove the 
                                                     
6 ECB statements are followed by press conference including a Questions & Answers session. We do not consider 
this Q&A text data since it would make the text data analyzed from the ECB and the FOMC structurally different 
and their tone would not be comparable. Contrary to the statements, Q&A text data are not prepared in advance 
and polished. Q&A text data could reflect the tone used by a journalist more than the policymakers’ one. The 
FOMC has introduced press conferences in April 2011 and only for meetings when publishing the Summary of 
Economic Projections, so text data would not be comparable between FOMC meetings and between the FOMC 
and the ECB over our sample. We therefore limit our investigation to statements. In addition, whether the tone is 
consciously or unconsciously conveyed in these statements is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future 
research. This paper aims to quantify central bank tone and whether central bank sentiment affects private beliefs. 
7 That would however be an interesting question and we leave that for future research. 
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subjectivity of human-reading coded indices. One major challenge for the analysis of central 
bank communication and for measuring such an intangible concept as central bank “waves 
of optimism and pessimism” is to convert the raw policy statements into quantities that we 
can systematically analyse. We compute three measures from each ECB and FOMC 
statement: the first, our benchmark, is the tone conveyed; the second is the tone conveyed 
weighted by the clarity of the tone measure conveyed, and the third is the ambiguity of the 
overall statement published.  
 
Before running any lexicographic analysis on a document, we perform a series of 
transformations on the original text. The text is first split into a sequence of substrings 
(tokens) whose characters are all transformed into lower case. We remove English stop 
words and stem English words using the Porter stemming algorithm, which is an iterative, 
rule-based replacement procedure of word suffixes (see Hansen, McMahon and Prat, 2015, or 
Hansen and McMahon, 2016, for details).  
 
To measure the tone of a document, we use “directional” word lists measuring words 
associated with positive and negative tone as proposed by three different dictionaries, each 
one capturing positive and negative tone in different environments. First, we use the 
dictionary proposed by Apel and Blix-Grimaldi (2012), which has been specifically 
developed for central bank communication, and is therefore the most relevant for the present 
question. Second, we use the seminal positive and negative categories of the General 
Inquirer’s Harvard IV-4 psychosocial dictionary.8 These categories reflect Osgood et al. 
(1957)'s semantic differential findings regarding basic and everyday language universals. 
Third, because the Harvard word list has not been specifically designed for a financial 
context, Loughran and McDonald (2011) have developed a list of words that better reflect the 
tone in a financial context. They suggest that almost three-fourths of negative words in the 
Harvard dictionary are not negative in a financial context. 
 
These three dictionaries have different characteristics and are complementary. Our preferred 
dictionary -that we use as a benchmark- is the one of Apel and Blix-Grimaldi (2012) and we 
provide results for all three dictionaries to give a comprehensive assessment of central bank 
tone. For illustration purposes, Table A of the Appendix shows the most illustrative and 
frequent positive and negative words identified in ECB and FOMC statements and gives the 
number of positive and negative words listed in each dictionary. One would naturally note 
that policymakers could use a combination of positive and negative words together as “solid 
decline” for instance, that they could phrase a given message in opposite terms as “increasing 
growth” versus “decreasing unemployment”, or that they could use a negation to convey an 
opposite message such as with “not improving” versus “worsening”. These cases do not 
weaken our empirical strategy and, on the contrary, even constitute the substance of this 
analysis. Our research question is exactly about these language choices and whether the use 
of some specific words rather than some others matters to convey an equivalent message. 
 
Once negative and positive words are identified with each dictionary, we construct a tone 
variable based on the balance between the number of positive and negative words that 
appear in a given document divided by the total number of words included in the document.   
Ξ𝑡  =  
PositiveWordst−NegativeWordst
TotalWordst
           (1) 
 
                                                     
8 The 182 General Inquirer categories were developed for social-science content-analysis research applications. 
The Harvard-IV-4 dictionary lists positive and negative words: http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/. 
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We therefore obtain three measures of tone, comprised between [-1; 1], using the three 
different dictionaries. The first is labelled Tone_AB based on the dictionary of Apel and Blix-
Grimaldi (2012), the second is labelled Tone_LM, based on the dictionary of Loughran and 
McDonald (2011), and the third is labelled Tone_Harv identified with the General Inquirer’s 
Harvard dictionary. A positive value of these tone variables for a given statement reflects 
some optimism in the language used, whereas a negative value reflects some pessimism. The 
descriptive statistics and evolution of the tone variables are shown in Table 1 and Figure 1.9 
The tone variables appear correlated to the business cycle over our sample.  
 
Second, we compute a robustness measure of tone weighted by the clarity of the tone 
measure. A statement of 100 words with 5 positive words and 0 negative word and another 
statement of 100 words with 55 positive words and 50 negative words would have the same 
tone score (0.05) based on equation (1), while the signal conveyed by the former may appear 
clearer than the latter because no negative word were used. A robustness measure 
(Tone_AB2), which would yield a score of 1 for the former statement and of 0.048 for the 
latter, is therefore computed using the sum of positive and negative words such as: 
Ξ𝑡
′ =  
PositiveWordst−NegativeWordst
PositiveWordst+NegativeWordst
           (2) 
 
Third, we define an ambiguity variable at the level of the overall document. Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) provide a dictionary listing words denoting uncertainty, in addition to the 
one about tone, with some emphasis on the general notion of imprecision, such as 
“approximate”, “contingency”, “depend”, “fluctuate”, “indefinite”, “uncertain” and “variability” 
for instance. This measure, computed as ratio of the number of uncertainty words over the 
total number of words in a document, is used to take into account the overall precision of the 
statement disclosed to the public. 
 
4. Financial and Macroeconomic Data 
 
This section describes the financial and macroeconomic data used to identify exogenous 
shocks to the tone variable Ξt conveyed by ECB and FOMC statements and to estimate the 
effects of sentiment shocks on the term structure of short-term interest rate expectations.  
 
Our dependent variables are the different maturities, from 1-month to 10-year, of 3-month 
Eonia (resp. LIBOR) OIS for the euro area (resp. the US) as they are good proxies of 
expectations of future short-term interest rates. OIS are instruments that allow financial 
institutions to swap the interest rates they are paying without having to refinance or change 
the terms of loans they have taken from other financial institutions. Typically, when two 
financial institutions create an OIS, one of the institutions is swapping a floating interest rate 
and the other institution is swapping a fixed short-term interest rate at a given maturity. 
Under absence of arbitrage, OIS rates reflect risk-adjusted financial market participants’ 
expectations of the average policy rate over the horizon corresponding to the maturity of the 
swap (for instance, from 6-month to 10-year in Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012). Our 
database has a daily frequency and spans from May 2005 to June 2015. 
 
As explanatory variables, we use several macroeconomic and financial variables. Because 
monetary policy decisions are taken the same day as sentiment is conveyed to the public 
                                                     
9 For comparison purposes over a similar scale (the number of positive and negative words being different in the 
three dictionaries with a factor of 1 to 100), the three measures have been standardized to a normal distribution 
with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. 
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through statements, our analysis requires controlling for the effect of the monetary shock.10 
We follow Kuttner (2001)’s methodology to identify monetary policy shocks in both the euro 
area and the US using changes in the price of futures contracts. For a monetary policy event 
on day d of the month m, the monetary shock can be derived from the variation in the rate 
implied by current-month futures contracts on that day. This identification of monetary 
shocks relies on the financial market participants’ interpretation of the monetary news 
disclosed that day, which encompasses central bank decisions, related to conventional or 
unconventional tools, and central bank information released at the same time. The price of 
the future being computed as the average monthly rate, the change in the futures rate must 
be augmented by a factor related to the number of days in the month affected by the change: 
𝑆𝑡  =
𝐷
𝐷−𝑑
(𝑓𝑚,𝑑
0 − 𝑓𝑚,𝑑−1
0 )         (3) 
 
St is the unexpected interest rate variation which constitutes a monetary shock, 𝑓𝑚,𝑑
0  is the 
current-month futures rate and D is the number of days in the month and d the day of the 
decision. Our dataset also includes returns of the Eurostoxx 50 and Standard and Poor’s 500 
price indices, which could potentially correlate with changes in private interest rate 
expectations. In the same vein, changes in commodity prices and financial instability can also 
explain changes in our dependent variables. We thus include in our specification changes in 
WTI oil prices and a variable capturing financial stress (the CISS for the euro area and the 
VIX for the US). Finally, we control that changes in our dependent variable are not driven by 
changes in private sentiment by including the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) of the 
European Commission for the euro area and the ISM Report on Business Survey index for 
the US. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the data series used in this paper.11 
 
For the identification of shocks, we also use the shadow rate calculated by Wu and Xia (2016) 
as an overall measure of monetary policy since our sample period encompasses periods 
when monetary policy makes use of both conventional and unconventional tools so as to 
take it into account with only one measure expressed in the interest rate space. The 
specification includes the year-over-year CPI inflation rate and real GDP growth rate.  
 
We also use macroeconomic forecasts from central banks (ECB and FOMC projections) and 
private agents: ECB and US Surveys of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The ECB/Eurosystem 
staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area are produced quarterly since June 2004. 
They are published during the first week of March, June, September and December and are 
presented as ranges for annual percentage changes in both HICP (the Harmonized Index for 
Consumer Prices) and real GDP. The FOMC publishes forecasts for key macroeconomic 
variables – inflation, real and nominal GDP growth, and unemployment – twice each year in 
the Monetary Policy Report to the Congress since 1979. Since October 2007, the publication of 
these FOMC forecasts has become quarterly and its horizon extended by one additional year. 
FOMC forecasts for current and next year was realized each year in late January/early 
February and late June/early July until 2007Q3, then in January, April, June and October 
until 2012Q4, and since then in March, June, September and December. We consider 
forecasts of the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) measure of inflation and real 
GDP. These forecasts are published as two ranges encompassing each individual FOMC 
member’s forecasts: the “full range” includes the highest and the lowest forecasts while the 
                                                     
10 In addition, the monetary shock may also convey policy and macro signals as analyzed by Baeriswyl and 
Cornand (2010), Melosi (2016) and Hubert and Maule (2016). 
11 Weekly, monthly and quarterly data have been constant-interpolated to daily frequency to respect the 
information structure. The assumption is that the information set at date t includes the last data point published, 
whereas a linear interpolation would assume that they already know the next data point to be published. 
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“central tendency” removes the three highest and three lowest forecasts. As standard in the 
literature, we use the midpoint of the full range.  
 
The ECB’s SPF is a quarterly survey of expectations for the rates of inflation, real GDP 
growth and unemployment in the euro area. Participants are experts affiliated with financial 
or non- financial institutions in the European Union. SPF forecasts are produced in February, 
May, August and November. HICP is measured as average annual percentage change for 
current and next years. The US SPF is collected from approximately 40 panellists and 
published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. SPF forecasts are also published in 
February, May, August, and November, and CPI forecasts are provided as year-over-year 
percent changes. We consider the median of individual responses as the SPF inflation 
forecast in our analysis.12 Data sources are presented in Table B in the Appendix. 
 
5. Identifying Exogenous Sentiment Shocks 
 
After having quantified the tone conveyed by ECB and FOMC statements, we need to 
overcome a second empirical challenge. Our computed tone variables are correlated to the 
business cycle and other macroeconomic and financial market variables, because the 
quantitative output of the computational linguistic method captures a combination of beliefs 
about the current and future state of the economy and sentiments. Thus, it is necessary to 
isolate exogenous sentiment shocks, orthogonal to fundamentals and expectations of future 
fundamentals, in order to be able to identify causal effects of policymakers’ sentiment on 
private interest rate expectations. This econometric requirement about sentiment shocks 
follows the theoretical assumption of Angeletos and La’O (2013).  
 
5.1. Identification Strategy 
 
The question of the most relevant identification strategy for taking care of endogeneity issues 
is an open question. Timing assumptions in recursive identifications –reasonable for real 
variables and their sluggish reaction to shocks and low sampling frequency– are not relevant 
when applied to financial variables or fast-moving variables. The two leading alternatives, 
proposed by Romer and Romer (2004) and Gertler and Karadi (2015), have also proven 
problematic. Because information sets may be different (Romer and Romer 2000, Blinder et 
al. 2008, Hubert 2015), the Romer and Romer (2004)’s identification approach may 
underestimate the extent to which market participants are able to predict future interest rate 
decisions. Ramey (2015) notes that Gertler and Karadi (2015)’s proxies may be predictable by 
Greenbook forecasts, while Miranda-Agrippino (2015) shows that market participants’ past 
information, prior to the date of the announcement, also predicts these future “surprises”.  
 
As discussed in Blanchard et al. (2013) and Ricco (2015), the presence of information frictions 
significantly modifies the identification problem. We therefore propose an identification that 
combines insights from the work of Romer and Romer (2004) and from the information 
frictions literature, also following the assumption of Angeletos and La’O (2013) that 
information is imperfect. We thus require the estimated shocks (labelled RR_Sentiment_xx, 
xx being either AB, LM or Harvard dictionaries) to be orthogonal to both central bank’s and 
                                                     
12 There may be agency problems between professional forecasters and their clients that would cause forecasters 
not to report their true expectations and perform strategic revisions. Models of agency problems suggest that 
forecasters are concerned about the accuracy of their forecasts and about their forecasts relative to others' 
forecasts. This implies that forecasters' predictions are centered on their true expectations, and so median 
forecasts reflect forecasters' true expectations (Lamont, 1995). 
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private agents’ information sets and to macro and financial market information for the 
identification of sentiment shocks to be achieved. Finally, in a context of imperfect 
information, the new information is only partially absorbed over time and, estimated 
surprises are likely to be a combination of both current and past shocks. 
 
To do so, we estimate the following equations (4)-(5) at the daily frequency and extract the 
residuals 𝜉t of such a model that we consider as an exogenous sentiment shock: 
Ξt = β0 + β1 Ξt-j + β2 Ωt + β3 Ψt + β4 Xt-1 + β5 Zt + 𝜉′t                         (4) 
𝜉′t = β6 + β7 𝜉′t-j + 𝜉t       (5) 
 
where j is the number of days between each policy statement, so Ξt-j is the tone of the 
previous ECB or FOMC policy statement. We assume in equation (4) that the sentiment 
variable 𝜉′t must be orthogonal to the contemporaneous policymakers’ information set Ωt, to 
the private agents’ one Ψt, to lagged financial market variables embedded in Xt-1, and to a 
vector Zt of contemporaneous and t-j macroeconomic variables (their past values at the date 
of the previous policy statement). Then, following insights from the information frictions 
literature, because 𝜉′t is likely to be a combination of current and past sentiment shocks, we 
estimate equation (5) so as to remove its AR(1) contribution. The error term 𝜉t reflects 
exogenous shocks to the tone variable and is interpreted as a sentiment shock. The 
policymakers’ information set Ωt comprises ECB (resp. FOMC) inflation and output 
projections for current and next calendar years, Ψt includes the ECB (resp. US) SPF inflation 
forecasts for 1, 2 and 5 years ahead (resp. next quarter, next year and 10 years ahead), Xt 
contains the CISS (resp. the VIX), EuroStoxx50 daily returns (resp. Standard and Poor’s 500), 
the oil price growth rate and the confidence index ESI (resp. the ISM survey), and Zt 
comprises the level of the overall policy stance measured by the shadow rate of Wu and Xia 
(2016), the inflation rate and the monthly-interpolated real GDP growth rate.13 Table 3 shows 
the estimated parameters of equations (4) and (5). 
 
A consequence of the timing of the right-hand-side vectors in equation (4) is that sentiment 
shocks can have contemporaneous effects on financial market variables, but do not affect 
contemporaneously central bank’s and private agents’ information sets or macroeconomic 
variables. We believe that the assumptions that central bank sentiment is only based on past 
data or that central banks do not move financial markets in real-time are fragile.14 
 
When extracting exogenous sentiment shock, the inclusion of both private and central bank 
forecasts in the regression model enables us to deal with three concerns. First, private agents 
and policymakers’ information sets include a large number of variables, and forecasts 
present the advantages of encompassing rich information sets. Bernanke et al. (2005) show 
that a data-rich environment approach modifies the identification of monetary shocks. 
Forecasts work as a FAVAR model as they summarise a large variety of macroeconomic 
variables as well as their expected evolutions. Second, forecasts are real-time data. Private 
agents and policymakers base their decisions on their information set in real-time, not on ex-
                                                     
13 Krippner (2013, 2014) proposes an alternative measure of the stance of monetary policy using factor models. 
His shadow rates have a correlation of 0.91 and 0.87 with the ones of Wu and Xia (2016) for the United States and 
euro area respectively. Our sentiment shocks with Krippner’s measures have a correlation of 0.94 and 0.98 with 
our benchmark sentiment shocks for the United States and euro area respectively. Estimates of the effect of 
sentiment shocks on OIS are similar and available from the authors upon request. 
14 One could argue that there may also be information frictions in financial markets and that financial variables in 
t-1 do not incorporate information news from t-2, t-3, etc. We control for this by estimating equation (4) with two 
additional lags. The correlation coefficient between this alternative shock series and the benchmark is 0.99 so that 
our identification strategy is not affected by this. These estimates are available from the authors upon request. 
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post revised data. Orphanides (2001, 2003) show that Taylor rule-type reaction functions 
estimated on revised data produce different outcomes when using real-time data. Third, 
private agents and policymakers are mechanically incorporating information about the 
current state of the economy and anticipate future macroeconomic conditions in their 
forecasts and we need to correct for their forward-looking information set. 
 
5.2. Robustness tests 
 
We assess the external validity of this identification strategy for extracting the sentiment 
shock in two ways. First, we compute sentiment shocks using two alternatives: (i) a Taylor 
rule-type equation applied to sentiment with a lag of the dependent variable, and 
contemporaneous inflation and output (TT_Sentiment_xx), and (ii) a VAR with financial 
market variables such as for the euro area: the VIX, the CISS (resp. the Saint-Louis Fed 
Financial Stress Index for the US), Eurostoxx 50 (resp. S&P500) returns, oil price variations, 
the Eonia (resp. the effective fed funds rate) and a tone measure ordered last in the vector of 
endogenous variables (VAR_Sentiment_xx). The first sentiment shock is the residual of the 
Taylor rule-type equation while the second sentiment shock is the Cholesky decomposition 
innovation. Figure 2 plots the time series and distribution of the estimated sentiment shocks 
using the AB dictionary (Figure A and B in the Appendix plots those using the LM and 
Harvard dictionaries). We then assess the autocorrelation and normality of these sentiment 
shocks. This calls for discarding VAR innovations as satisfactory shocks, since these shocks 
are auto-correlated and the kurtosis of their distribution is very low. Tables 4-A and 4-B (for 
the euro area and the US respectively) show normality and autocorrelation tests together 
with some descriptive statistics and the correlation of shocks. Second, if our estimated series 
of sentiment shocks are relevant, they should be unpredictable from movements in data. We 
assess the predictability of the estimated shock series with Granger-causality type tests using 
22 macroeconomic and financial variables, including lagged sentiment. Tables 4-A and 4-B 
also show the adjusted R² and F-stats of an OLS estimation that aims to test the null 
hypothesis that our estimated series of exogenous shocks are unpredictable. It suggests that 
the Romer-Romer-type and Taylor rule-type shock series are relevant to be used in our 
second-stage estimations so as to assess their effects on private inflation expectations, 
whereas the VAR innovations are not. 
 
We also assess the internal validity of our identification strategy for extracting the sentiment 
shock in two ways.15 First, the central bank projections that we use to capture the information 
set of policymakers (Ωt) could be a function of the sentiment of policymakers. So if central 
bank projections are influenced by the policymakers’ sentiment, then equation (4) may suffer 
an endogeneity bias and the sentiment shock 𝜉t may be misspecified. We correct for this 
potential bias by using Greenbook forecasts as an instrument for FOMC forecasts. Greenbook 
forecasts are staff model-based forecasts, formed and provided to the FOMC members before 
FOMC meetings. Therefore, Greenbook forecasts cannot be correlated to policymakers’ 
sentiment. We estimate the following equation: Ωt = f(Φt) + νt, where Φt encompasses 
Greenbook forecasts, and we use the fitted values of Ωt in equation (4) so as to ensure that 
our identification of sentiment shocks is not biased by endogeneity (see section 6.3). The fact 
that the correlation between νt and 𝜉t is non-significant suggests that central bank projections 
are not influenced by the policymakers’ sentiment. The correlation between our benchmark 
sentiment shock, RR_Sentiment_AB, and this alternative one, RR_Sentiment_AB_GB, is 0.68. 
                                                     
15 The two tests are performed only for the FOMC for data availability reasons. The ECB does not publish both 
policymakers and staff forecasts, and the ECB forecasts are published as point forecasts so we cannot compute 
dispersion and skewness measures. 
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Second, one may argue that the midpoint of the range of central bank projections does not 
capture the full information set of policymakers and in particular the dispersion of 
macroeconomic outcomes or the balance of risks foreseen by policymakers, and that our 
sentiment shock suffers from another type of omitted variable bias. We therefore include in 
Ωt a measure of the dispersion of FOMC forecasts (the distance between the upper and lower 
bound of the full range) and a measure of the skewness of FOMC forecasts (the difference 
between (i) the distance between the upper band of the full range and the upper band of the 
central tendency and (ii) the distance between the lower bound of the central tendency and 
the lower bound of the full range). The correlation between our benchmark sentiment shock 
and this alternative sentiment shock, labelled RR_Sentiment_AB_SK, is 0.99 and suggests 
that the estimated sentiment shock are not biased by the representation of the information set 
of policymakers. 
 
6. The Effect of Sentiment on Policy Expectations 
 
6.1. The empirical methodology 
 
We use a high-frequency methodology to estimate the effects of sentiment, which consists in 
focusing on movements in some asset prices in a narrow window around ECB and FOMC 
policy meetings. This approach was initiated by Cook and Hahn (1989), Kuttner (2001), and 
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002). The key assumption is that the reaction of interest rate 
expectations that are continually affected by various factors can be specifically attributed to 
monetary news on the day of the policy announcement, or said differently that there is no 
other macroeconomic news during that window. Since interest rate expectations adjust in 
real-time to news about the macroeconomy, movements in interest rate expectations during 
the window of a policy announcement only reflect the effect of news about monetary policy. 
This is crucial for identification since it strips out the endogenous variation in interest rate 
expectations associated with other shocks than monetary news.16 
 
We focus our empirical analysis on a narrow window (from the day before, close of business, 
to the day of the announcement, close of business) around ECB and FOMC policy 
announcements. On these days, policymakers do not only provide the decision about the 
level of key interest rates but also publish statements about the rationale for their decisions 
and their view about the current and future state of the economy which would be 
informative of the future path of its monetary policy. The informational content of these 
policy announcements can be decomposed in two components: the policy decision and 
signals about the state of the economy and the future likely policy path. However, the signals 
themselves can be decomposed between the central bank beliefs about fundamentals and 
sentiments. In line with the theoretical framework described in section 2, our analysis 
requires to make the sentiment variable orthogonal to fundamentals –as performed in section 
5– so we can single out the causal effect of the central bank sentiment on revisions in private 
interest rate expectations.  
 
There are two other issues that we need to overcome.  First, as it is common with financial 
variables, the variance of our dependent variables changes over time. We therefore use an 
                                                     
16 For example, a positive employment announcement that systematically occurs the day before a policy 
announcement will already have been factored into interest rate expectations when the central bank makes its 
announcement. A central assumption of these high-frequency methodologies is that all information flows 
happening before the window of the event at date t have been incorporated in prices in t-1. Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2013) use a similar approach focusing on the increased volatility generated by monetary news. 
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ARCH (autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) model to treat heteroskedasticity as a 
variance to be properly modelled and take into account this “volatility clustering”. Second, 
because the estimated sentiment shocks from equations (4)-(5) are generated regressors that 
might cause biased standard errors; we compute standard errors robust to misspecification 
using the Huber-White-sandwich estimator.17 The estimated equations are the following: 
∆𝑟𝑡,𝑚
𝐸
  = β0 + β1 ξt + β2 St + β3 Mt + εt , εt ~ (0, 𝜎𝑡
2)                                 (6) 
𝜎𝑡
2
  = 𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖 𝜀𝑡−𝑖
2𝑝
𝑖=1                  (7) 
 
where  ∆𝑟𝑡,ℎ
𝐸
  is the change between t and t-1 in euro area (resp. US) interest rate expectations 
for horizon m, ξt is the ECB (resp. FOMC) sentiment shock estimated through equations (4)-
(5), St is monetary surprises à la Kuttner (2001), and Mt is a vector of controls including the 
CISS (resp. the VIX), the Eurostoxx50 (resp. S&P 500) returns, oil price variations and the ESI 
index (resp. ISM). The number of lags p (4 for the euro area and 1 for the US) in the variance 
equation is determined by their significance. We also need to acknowledge that while 
sentiment shocks are orthogonal to macroeconomic and monetary policy developments by 
construction, they may not be to monetary shocks.18 We are particularly interested in the β1 
coefficient which should be interpreted as the effect of central bank sentiment on revisions of 
interest rate expectations controlling for the monetary decision and some other financial 
developments captured by the Mt vector that might have potentially occurred the same days. 
 
6.2. Benchmark estimates 
  
We test the prediction -presented in section 2- that sentiment affects interest rate expectations 
by estimating equations (6)-(7) with an ARCH specification. Our benchmark analysis is 
performed with the sentiment measure generated with the dictionary of Apel and Blix 
Grimaldi (2012). We assess our hypothesis on interest rate expectations at horizons 1, 3, 6 and 
9 months, and 1, 2, 3, 5 and 10 years. Our estimation sample starts in August 2005 so we have 
2576 observations for each maturity. Tables 5-A and 5-B show the benchmark results. The β1 
coefficient is positive and significant for horizons from 3 months to 10 years ahead in the 
euro area, and for horizons 1 and 3 months and from 1 to 3 years in the Unites States. The 
peak effect in terms of magnitude and significance is at 1 to 3 years ahead in the euro area 
and at 1 and 2 years ahead in the United States. Using Loughran and McDonald (2011)’s and 
Harvard’s word lists, the β1 coefficient remains positive and significant for the maturity of 1-
year at minimum. These results show that sentiment shocks increase private interest rate 
expectations. The information conveyed by the sentiment expressed in ECB and FOMC 
statements appears to be interpreted by private agents for similar horizons to the 
transmission lags of monetary policy, estimated to be around 18 months in Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992) or Bernanke and Mihov (1998). The β2 coefficient associated with monetary 
surprises is also positive and significant but for horizons from 1 month to 3 years in the euro 
area and for horizons from 1 month to 9 months in the United States. It is worth stressing 
that in the euro area, shocks to sentiment account at maximum for 4% of the variance of 
interest rate expectations 3 and 5 years ahead on meeting days, while monetary shocks 
account at maximum for 31% of the variance of interest rate expectations but at shorter 
horizons, with this contribution decreasing with maturity. In the United States, shocks to 
sentiment account at maximum for 5% of the variance of interest rate expectations 2 and 3 
years ahead, while monetary shocks only account at maximum for 7% of the variance of 
interest rates expectations 6 and 9 months ahead. 
                                                     
17 This issue is common to all empirical studies estimating exogenous shocks in a first step as in Romer and 
Romer (2004), but is more acute when the generated regressors are not normally distributed. 
18 Tables 4-A and 4-B show that their correlation is low: 0.04 is the euro area and 0.18 in the US. 
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6.3. Sensitivity analysis 
 
We estimate various alternative specifications to assess the robustness of the benchmark 
result. First, we estimate the effects of the sentiment identified from an alternative tone 
measure weighted by the clarity (the sum of positive and negative words) of the tone 
conveyed -Ξ𝑡
′- computed with equation (2). Second, because the Forward Guidance (FG) 
policy is using communication and statements as a tool to manage policy expectations, we 
estimate the effect of sentiment when controlling for the FG announcements (using dummies 
for the day FG has been introduced and then modified). Third, for the US only because of 
data constraints, we identify sentiment shocks by instrumenting FOMC forecasts with 
Greenbook forecasts or augment the policymakers’ information set with dispersion and 
skewness measures of FOMC forecasts. Fourth, we consider shocks identified through a 
Taylor rule-type equation using Apel and Blix-Grimaldi (2012)’s, Loughran and McDonald 
(2011)’s and Harvard’s dictionaries. Fifth, we test alternative estimation methods such as 
TARCH and OLS models. Threshold ARCH enables to take into account the asymmetric 
nature of positive and negative innovations: a positive shock will have a different effect on 
volatility than will a negative shock. On financial markets, downward movements (“bad 
news”) are followed by higher market volatility than upward movements (“good news”). 
Sixth, we then estimate equations (6)-(7) on Wednesday and Thursday for the ECB 
(respectively Tuesday and Wednesday for the FOMC) of the sample rather than all days. 
Assuming that P1 is our treatment sample and P2 our control sample, P1 includes ECB (resp. 
FOMC) announcements that happen the first Wednesday or Thursday of each month for the 
ECB (resp. Tuesday and Wednesday for the FOMC). P2 is another sample containing all 
other Wednesdays and Thursdays (resp. Tuesday and Wednesday for the FOMC) during our 
analysis period. P2 contains days different from P1 to the extent that none monetary or 
sentiment shocks occurred. However, because they are the same days in the week, they are 
comparable on several other dimensions such as worldwide publications of other economic 
news for example. The sample is reduced to 1030 observations for the ECB and 1034 for the 
FOMC. Seventh, although this goes against the very objective of high-frequency studies of 
isolating an event from others and should reduce the precision of the estimation, we modify 
the window over which we assess the response of changes in interest rate expectations: we 
consider the variation between t and t-2, and between t+1 and t-1. Eighth, we then include a 
lag of the dependent variable in equation (6). Ninth, we estimate equation (6) without the Mt 
vector of controls to examine potential over-identification issues and further verify the 
orthogonality condition of our estimated shocks. Tenth, we estimate the effects of sentiment 
during normal times, so before the implementation of the FG policy or before the 
conventional tool of monetary policy has reached its Effective Lower Bound (ELB). Tables 6-
A and 6-B present estimates of β1 for these alternative specifications.19 The robustness tests 
confirm the positive coefficient of sentiment shocks on interest rate expectations, primarily at 
work around the 1-year maturity both in the euro area and in the United States. 
 
6.4. Dynamic estimates  
 
This section investigates the dynamic effects of sentiment and assess how persistent is the 
effect evidenced in section 6.2. Our preferred approach is to use the local projections method 
of Jorda (2005). Impulse response functions obtained from VARs may be imposing excessive 
                                                     
19 In order to control that the effect of sentiment is not a statistical artefact, we also estimate the effect of the 
absolute value of sentiment shocks, which should not yield the same outcomes as sentiment shocks make sense 
through their positive and negative values. The effect is not positive and significant, and so suggests than the 
effect of sentiment is not an artefact. Estimates are available from the authors upon request. 
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restrictions on the endogenous dynamics, so that estimates derived from local projections, 
more flexible approaches, might be preferable. Another advantage is the robustness of local 
projections to model misspecification to estimate dynamic responses to exogenous shocks.20 
 
Considering that exogenous shocks have been identified beforehand, Jorda (2005) suggests 
estimating a set of h regressions representing the impulse response of the dependent variable 
at the horizon h to a given exogenous shock 𝜖𝑡 at time t: 
𝑦𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼ℎ + 𝛽ℎ𝜖𝑡 + 𝜙ℎ(𝐿)𝑋𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡+ℎ     (8) 
 
where 𝑦𝑡+ℎ is the dependent variable at the horizon h, 𝜖𝑡 represents the given exogenous 
shock,  𝜙ℎ(𝐿) is a polynomial lag operator, and Xt is a vector of control variables. In our case, 
rather than estimating equation (7) with OLS, we estimate the ARCH model of equations (6)-
(7) so that the variable of interest is ∆𝑟𝑡,𝑚
𝐸
  the daily change in euro area (resp. US) interest rate 
expectations for horizon h, the exogenous shock is the sentiment shock ξt, and the vector Xt 
encompasses the vectors St and Mt from equation (6) and 𝜂𝑡+ℎis estimated as in equation (7). 
Figure 3 plots the results from estimating the dynamic effects, over the following 15 business 
days, of sentiment shocks on 1- and 2-year OIS (the main maturities for which we find a 
significant effect) and shows that, except for 2-year OIS in the US for which the effect of 
sentiment shocks lessens, the effect in the euro area and for 1-year OIS in the US persists and 
even increases. 
 
6.5. State-dependent estimates 
  
A further step in our analysis is to investigate whether private agents process sentiment 
shocks differently conditional on the characteristics of the sentiment shock. For instance, the 
effect of sentiment could depend on the ambiguity of policy statements. In a Bayesian 
updating model of beliefs, the weight given to a signal (the sentiment shock) should depend 
on the precision of this signal and so whether this signal is informative for the formation of 
beliefs. We use the measure of ambiguity described in section 3.2 to capture the precision of 
the message conveyed in central bank statements. We expect the effect of positive sentiment 
shocks to be stronger if the signal is more precise (i.e. if ambiguity is lower) and vice versa. 
The effect of sentiment could also depend on two features of the sentiment shock such as the 
sign (positive for optimism and negative for pessimism) or the size of sentiment shocks. 
 
Sentiment shocks could also be interpreted differently according to the state of the economy 
or policy decisions. We test whether the effect of sentiment is different during a recession 
using a dummy that takes one in a recession according to the classification proposed by the 
CEPR and the NBER. We also estimate the effect of sentiment shocks conditional on the level 
of inflation. Finally, we could expect positive sentiment shocks to have less effect on interest 
rate expectations when interacted with a positive monetary shock (i.e. a contractionary 
shock) as the policy decision might already diffuse some optimism beyond the expected 
future state of the economy, whereas an equivalent positive sentiment shock would have 
more impact when associated with a negative monetary shock (i.e. an expansionary shock) 
because it conveys specific information not shared with the monetary shock. 
  
We augment equation (6) with an interaction term between sentiment shocks and the state 
variables (that we also include in isolation in equation (6) if not already present) we would 
                                                     
20 Another alternative is to estimate the effect of sentiment shocks in a simple autoregressive distributed lag 
(ADL) model. One potential drawback of this approach for our specification is the differencing of the dependent 
variable over the long run, which goes against the high-frequency identification. 
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like to focus on. Tables 7-A and 7-B show estimates for the different cases described above. 
The non-linear effect of sentiment shocks conditional on the precision of the signal disclosed 
to the public (the ambiguity measure) is at work for maturities between 1 month and 2 years 
in the United States, and at the 1, 2 months and 1 year horizons in the euro area. As expected, 
the effect of sentiment shocks is stronger when ambiguity is low (so the signal is more 
precise) rather than when ambiguity is high. Looking at the effect of sentiment conditional 
on the sign of the sentiment shock, it appears that in the United States, results are driven by 
pessimism (negative shocks) whereas the interaction term in the euro area is not significant. 
The effect of negative sentiment shocks is significant whereas the effect of positive sentiment 
shocks is not, though they are not significantly different from each other. This suggests 
nevertheless a similar non-linearity than in the US. A much pronounced difference between 
the euro area and the US arises from the interaction with the size of sentiment shocks 
(estimated with their square values): big shocks have more impact than small shocks in the 
euro area, whereas small shocks have more impact than big shocks in the US. Following the 
insights of Bayesian belief updating, private agents get more information for their formation 
of beliefs about future policy from small shocks than big shocks in the US and this suggests 
that they are potentially less able to extract information about future policy from extreme 
values of sentiment conveyed by FOMC policymakers. 
 
The interaction term with the recession dummy is negative and significant in the US for 
maturities of 1 and 2 years, but is never significant in the euro area. The FOMC sentiment has 
more effect during expansions than recessions, suggesting that private agents get more 
information for their beliefs about the expected future policy rate from sentiment when the 
economy is doing well. Said differently, their knowledge of the reaction function of 
policymakers during expansions may be less clear so they put more weight on additional 
signals. The interaction term with inflation is positive and significant in the US for maturities 
between 9 months and 3 year and is significant in the euro area at the 6 months and 2 years 
maturities. Both ECB and FOMC sentiment shocks have more effect when inflation is high. 
Again, this may suggest that when inflation is high private agents have a less clear 
knowledge of the reaction function of policymakers and so give more weight to sentiment to 
predict the future policy rate. Finally, the non-linear effect of sentiment shocks conditional 
on monetary shocks is significant and negative at maturities between 1 month and 1 year in 
the United States and at maturities of 1 and 2 months in the euro area. FOMC and ECB 
sentiment has a lower effect (even negative in the US) with positive monetary shocks than 
with negative monetary shocks. The effect of sentiment is reinforced by expansionary 
monetary shocks whereas sentiment seems less relevant when associated with contractionary 
shocks.21 Overall, these estimates suggest that the reaction of private agents to the sentiment 
conveyed by policymakers is signal- and state-dependent. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper tests in the context of monetary policy the theoretical prediction of Angeletos and 
La’O (2013) that sentiment may have aggregate effects. We quantify the concept of central 
bank sentiment and test its potential importance in economic decisions. Using computational 
linguistic methods, we quantify the tone from which we identify sentiment shocks conveyed 
by ECB and FOMC statements. We are able to assess whether this policymakers’ sentiment 
affects private interest rate expectations. 
 
                                                     
21 We have also estimated the interaction of sentiment shocks with measures of private market sentiment proxied 
by the CISS or the VIX and found no non-linear effects. Estimates are available from the authors upon request. 
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We find that positive shocks to sentiment (i.e. optimism shocks) increase private interest rate 
expectations at horizons from 3 months to 10 years ahead in the euro area, and for horizons 1 
and 3 months ahead and from 1 to 3 years ahead in the US. The peak effect in terms of 
magnitude and significance is around the 1 and 2 years maturity both in the euro area and in 
the US. We also find that the effect of sentiment shocks is smaller when the precision of the 
signal conveyed (i.e. the ambiguity of central bank statements) is low rather than when the 
precision is high. The effect of sentiment shocks also depends on their sign and size, as well 
as on the level of inflation, the business cycle and monetary shocks. The reaction of private 
agents to the sentiment conveyed by policymakers is signal- and state-dependent. 
 
These results give policymakers some insights on how private agents interpret and respond 
to the sentiment conveyed by central bank communication. Our results suggest that 
sentiment shocks matter for shaping private interest rate expectations but that they do not 
convey the same information when they happen with tightening or easing policies. The 
coordination of the sentiment conveyed by central bank communication and policy decisions 
thus appears important for managing interest rate expectations. 
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Figure 1. Central Bank Tone variables 
 
Euro Area United States 
  
Note: The tone series have been computed from equation (1) and the three dictionaries Apel and Blix 
Grimaldi (2012) -AB-, Loughran and McDonald (2011) -LM-, and the General Inquirer’s Harvard IV-4 
psychosocial -Harv-, and they have been standardized to a normal distribution. The three bold lines are the 
respective moving average over the last 6 statements for the three tone measures. 
  
22 
 
Figure 2. Central Bank Sentiment shocks and their distribution 
 
Euro Area United States 
  
 
Euro Area United States 
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Figure 3. Local Projection Estimates 
 
Euro Area 
 
United States 
 
Note: Impulse responses to a positive sentiment shock, over the following 15 business days, estimated 
with equations (6)-(7) using local projections as described in equation (8) with 90 per cent confidence 
intervals and the cumulated effect of horizon specific estimates.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Central Bank Tone variables 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All words 119 858 175 134 1319
Positive_AB 119 13 7 2 31
Negative_AB 119 7 4 0 21
Positive_LM 119 36 11 9 63
Negative_LM 119 37 13 5 74
Positive_Harv 119 167 36 37 278
Negative_Harv 119 62 17 13 103
Tone_AB 119 0.006 0.011 -0.020 0.028
Tone_AB2 119 0.239 0.441 -0.733 1
Tone_LM 119 0.001 0.015 -0.038 0.045
Tone_Harv 119 0.123 0.020 0.064 0.180
Ambiguity 119 0.065 0.014 0.040 0.104
Tone_AB Tone_AB2 Tone_LM Tone_Harv Ambiguity
Tone_AB 1
Tone_AB2 0.97 1
Tone_LM 0.51 0.54 1
Tone_Harv 0.34 0.39 0.64 1
Ambiguity 0.54 0.55 0.65 0.32 1
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All words 85 278 115 109 547
Positive_AB 85 3 2 0 7
Negative_AB 85 3 2 0 8
Positive_LM 85 10 6 1 24
Negative_LM 85 9 5 0 19
Positive_Harv 85 49 27 12 112
Negative_Harv 85 9 5 0 20
Tone_AB 85 -0.001 0.011 -0.027 0.028
Tone_AB2 84 0.053 0.539 -1 1
Tone_LM 85 0.002 0.016 -0.048 0.034
Tone_Harv 85 0.134 0.031 0.044 0.187
Ambiguity 85 0.060 0.016 0.010 0.103
Tone_AB Tone_AB2 Tone_LM Tone_Harv Ambiguity
Tone_AB 1
Tone_AB2 0.93 1
Tone_LM 0.47 0.52 1
Tone_Harv 0.28 0.27 0.55 1
Ambiguity 0.09 0.16 0.54 0.51 1
Euro Area
United States
Note: Tone_AB, Tone_LM and Tone_Harv are computed based on equation (1),
while Tone_AB2 is based on equation (2).
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Benchmark model 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
oieur1m 2576 1.40 1.53 -0.13 4.31
oieur3m 2576 1.42 1.55 -0.13 4.35
oieur6m 2576 1.45 1.57 -0.13 4.45
oieur9m 2576 1.49 1.59 -0.14 4.57
oieur1y 2576 1.52 1.60 -0.14 4.67
oieur2y 2576 1.66 1.57 -0.16 4.82
oieur3y 2576 1.81 1.52 -0.14 4.86
oieur5y 2576 2.13 1.43 -0.07 4.81
oieur10y 2576 2.70 1.23 0.19 4.86
kutt_eonia 2576 0.00 0.01 -0.22 0.17
ciss 2576 0.26 0.20 0.02 0.84
r_euro50 2576 0.00 0.01 -0.08 0.10
oil 2576 0.00 0.11 -0.55 0.33
esi 2576 98.52 9.96 69.3 113.1
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
oiusd1m 2652 1.50 2.01 0.07 5.37
oiusd3m 2652 1.51 2.03 0.07 5.44
oiusd6m 2652 1.54 2.04 0.07 5.56
oiusd9m 2652 1.56 2.04 0.07 5.62
oiusd1y 2652 1.90 1.99 0.25 5.76
oiusd2y 2652 2.08 1.85 0.34 5.73
oiusd3y 2652 2.32 1.73 0.42 5.72
oiusd5y 2652 2.80 1.52 0.73 5.76
oiusd10y 2652 3.51 1.22 1.54 5.85
kutt_ffr 2652 0.00 0.07 -2.95 0.50
vix 2652 21.27 8.12 11.72 59.77
r_sp500 2651 0.00 0.01 -0.09 0.11
oil 2627 0.00 0.11 -0.55 0.33
ismbs 2652 53.51 4.15 37.6 61.3
United States
Euro Area
Note: Kuttner monetary shocks are computed based on equation (3).
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Table 3. Sentiment shocks identification 
 
  
Tone_AB Tone_LM Tone_Harv Tone_AB Tone_LM Tone_Harv
(I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III)
l1.Tone 0.509*** 0.426*** 0.306*** l1.Tone 0.562*** 0.476*** 0.444***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
ecb_cpi_cy -0.011 0.002 0.011 fomc_pce_cy 0.022* 0.024* 0.004
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
ecb_cpi_ny 0.013 0.048*** 0.037** fomc_pce_ny -0.016 -0.024 0.006
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
ecb_gdp_cy -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 fomc_gdp_cy 0.001 0.002 0.002
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]
ecb_gdp_ny 0.002 0.011 0.021* fomc_gdp_ny 0.006 0.004 0.000
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
spf_1 0.029 0.010 0.011 spf_cpi_0 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002
[0.03] [0.04] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
spf_2 0.023 -0.034 0.017 spf_cpi_1 0.011 -0.003 0.018
[0.05] [0.07] [0.08] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
spf_5 -0.101 0.103 -0.039 spf_cpi_10 -0.035 0.034 -0.004
[0.07] [0.08] [0.09] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
cpi 0.000 -0.011 -0.017* cpi 0.005 -0.003 0.000
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
l1.cpi 0.023* -0.134*** -0.233*** l1.cpi -0.013 -0.277*** -0.108***
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
gdp -0.009 -0.005 -0.029** gdp -0.012 -0.004 -0.006
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
l1.gdp 0.226*** 0.351*** 0.368*** l1.gdp 0.230*** 0.225*** 0.163***
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
shadow -0.010* -0.005 -0.020*** shadow -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
l1.shadow 0.188*** 0.036** 0.01 l1.shadow 0.023 0.021 -0.353***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
L.ciss 0.006 -0.010* 0.005 L.vix -0.006 -0.006 0.001
[0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
L.r_euro50 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005* L.r_sp500 -0.001 0.001 0.008***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
L.oil 0.000 0.006* 0.001 L.oil 0.003 0.002 0.002
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
L.esi 0.011 0.000 0.026** L.ismbs 0.005 0.005 0.004
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
constant 0.104 -0.249* -0.082 constant 0.037 -0.080 -0.044
[0.11] [0.13] [0.15] [0.09] [0.10] [0.08]
N 2626 2626 2626 N 2626 2626 2626
R² 0.70 0.51 0.34 R² 0.49 0.43 0.61
Resid. of (I) Resid. of (II) Resid. of (III) Resid. of (I) Resid. of (II) Resid. of (III)
(IV) (V) (VI) (IV) (V) (VI)
AR(1) -0.054 -0.115 -0.055 AR(1) 0.048 -0.048 0.090
[0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11]
constant 0.009 -0.007 -0.008 constant -0.003 0.005 0.019
[0.05] [0.06] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] [0.07]
N 116 116 116 N 83 83 83
R² 0.003 0.013 0.003 R² 0.002 0.002 0.008
Euro Area United States
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Paremeters are estimated based on equations (4)
and (5). L is the lag operator (i.e. the value the day before) and l1 is the value at the date of the previous statement.
Equation (4) Equation (4)
Equation (5) Equation (5)
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Table 4–A. Properties of estimated ECB sentiment shocks 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TT_Sentiment_AB 119 -0.01 0.74 -1.81 2.78
RR_Sentiment_AB 119 0.00 0.68 -1.52 2.63
VAR_Sentiment_AB 119 -0.02 0.94 -2.40 2.81
TT_Sentiment_LM 119 -0.02 0.83 -2.50 2.15
RR_Sentiment_LM 119 0.00 0.77 -1.66 2.21
VAR_Sentiment_LM 119 -0.03 0.93 -2.67 2.66
TT_Sentiment_Harv 119 0.00 0.59 -1.66 1.95
RR_Sentiment_Harv 119 0.00 0.53 -1.59 1.67
VAR_Sentiment_Harv 119 0.00 0.97 -2.32 1.90
TT_Sent_AB RR_Sent_AB VAR_Sent_AB kutt_eonia Tone_AB
TT_Sentiment_AB 1
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.89 1
VAR_Sentiment_AB 0.60 0.57 1
kutt_eonia 0.06 0.04 -0.01 1
Tone_AB 0.59 0.55 0.99 0.00 1
RR_Sent_AB RR_Sent_LM RR_Sent_Harv kutt_eonia esi
RR_Sentiment_AB 1
RR_Sentiment_LM 0.22 1
RR_Sentiment_Harv 0.02 0.46 1
kutt_eonia 0.04 0.17 -0.03 1
esi 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.14 1
Variable Obs W' V' z Prob>z
TT_Sentiment_AB 119 0.99 0.98 -0.05 0.52
RR_Sentiment_AB 119 0.99 1.26 0.46 0.32
VAR_Sentiment_AB 119 0.99 1.37 0.63 0.26
TT_Sentiment_LM 119 0.97 3.43 2.46 0.01
RR_Sentiment_LM 119 0.97 3.30 2.39 0.01
VAR_Sentiment_LM 119 0.98 1.64 0.98 0.16
TT_Sentiment_Harv 119 0.99 1.17 0.31 0.38
RR_Sentiment_Harv 119 0.99 1.42 0.70 0.24
VAR_Sentiment_Harv 119 0.99 1.14 0.26 0.40
AR(1) coef. F-stat p-value Adjusted R²
TT_Sentiment_AB -0.20** TT_Sent_AB 2.30 0.00 0.19
RR_Sentiment_AB -0.01 RR_Sent_AB 1.13 0.33 0.02
VAR_Sentiment_AB 0.80*** VAR_Sent_AB 14.29 0.00 0.71
TT_Sentiment_LM -0.23** TT_Sent_LM 3.56 0.00 0.32
RR_Sentiment_LM 0.02 RR_Sent_LM 2.68 0.00 0.24
VAR_Sentiment_LM 0.64*** VAR_Sent_LM 8.93 0.00 0.59
TT_Sentiment_Harv -0.10 TT_Sent_Harv 2.06 0.01 0.16
RR_Sentiment_Harv 0.00 RR_Sent_Harv 1.24 0.24 0.04
VAR_Sentiment_Harv 0.49*** VAR_Sent_Harv 4.06 0.00 0.36
Descriptive statistics
Note: The vector of variables for predictability tests includes current and lagged (at the date of the previous
statement) values of cpi, gdp, vix, ciss, r_euro50, oil, esi, eonia, shadow rate, copti_ab, copti_lm, copti_harv.
Autocorrelation test Predictability of exogenous shock series
Correlation
Shapiro-Francia normality test
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Table 4–B. Properties of estimated FOMC sentiment shocks 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TT_Sentiment_AB 85 -0.01 0.74 -2.05 2.52
RR_Sentiment_AB 85 0.00 0.71 -1.51 2.47
VAR_Sentiment_AB 85 0.01 0.97 -2.16 2.45
TT_Sentiment_LM 85 0.00 0.79 -2.22 1.69
RR_Sentiment_LM 85 0.00 0.74 -2.25 1.62
VAR_Sentiment_LM 85 0.02 0.93 -2.80 1.98
TT_Sentiment_Harv 85 0.01 0.70 -2.07 1.71
RR_Sentiment_Harv 85 0.00 0.62 -2.23 1.26
VAR_Sentiment_Harv 85 0.02 0.93 -2.44 1.68
TT_Sent_AB RR_Sent_AB VAR_Sent_AB kutt_ffr Tone_AB
TT_Sentiment_AB 1
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.97 1
VAR_Sentiment_AB 0.74 0.70 1
kutt_ffr 0.17 0.18 0.28 1
Tone_AB 0.74 0.69 0.99 0.28 1
RR_Sent_AB RR_Sent_LM RR_Sent_Harv kutt_ffr ismbs
RR_Sentiment_AB 1
RR_Sentiment_LM 0.27 1
RR_Sentiment_Harv 0.26 0.58 1
kutt_ffr 0.18 0.02 -0.18 1
ismbs 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.33 1
Variable Obs W' V' z Prob>z
TT_Sentiment_AB 85 0.97 2.18 1.53 0.06
RR_Sentiment_AB 85 0.96 2.80 2.01 0.02
VAR_Sentiment_AB 85 0.97 2.58 1.85 0.03
TT_Sentiment_LM 85 0.97 2.65 1.90 0.03
RR_Sentiment_LM 85 0.98 1.65 0.98 0.16
VAR_Sentiment_LM 85 0.98 1.90 1.26 0.10
TT_Sentiment_Harv 85 0.97 2.58 1.85 0.03
RR_Sentiment_Harv 85 0.95 4.06 2.74 0.00
VAR_Sentiment_Harv 85 0.98 1.67 1.00 0.16
AR(1) coef. F-stat p-value Adjusted R²
TT_Sentiment_AB 0.02 TT_Sent_AB 2.28 0.01 0.25
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.01 RR_Sent_AB 1.96 0.02 0.20
VAR_Sentiment_AB 0.66*** VAR_Sent_AB 6.33 0.00 0.58
TT_Sentiment_LM -0.09 TT_Sent_LM 2.06 0.02 0.21
RR_Sentiment_LM -0.01 RR_Sent_LM 1.62 0.07 0.14
VAR_Sentiment_LM 0.57*** VAR_Sent_LM 4.36 0.00 0.46
TT_Sentiment_Harv 0.03 TT_Sent_Harv 1.27 0.23 0.06
RR_Sentiment_Harv 0.01 RR_Sent_Harv 0.47 0.97 -0.16
VAR_Sentiment_Harv 0.73*** VAR_Sent_Harv 5.47 0.00 0.53
Note: The vector of variables for predictability tests includes current and lagged (at the date of the previous
statement) values of cpi, gdp, vix, stlfsi, r_sp500, oil, ismbs, ffr, shadow rate, copti_ab, copti_lm, copti_harv.
Descriptive statistics
Correlation
Shapiro-Francia normality test
Autocorrelation test Predictability of exogenous shock series
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Table 5–A. Benchmark ECB model 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
oieur1m oieur3m oieur6m oieur9m oieur1y oieur2y oieur3y oieur5y oieur10y
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.002 0.003* 0.004* 0.008** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.021** 0.012*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
kutt_eonia 0.094** 0.268** 0.382*** 0.401*** 0.399*** 0.341* 0.237* 0.162 -0.01
[0.04] [0.14] [0.12] [0.11] [0.13] [0.18] [0.12] [0.10] [0.10]
ciss 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
r_euro50 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.016***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
oil 0.000 0.002** 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.002*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
esi 0.000 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
constant 0.000 0.001** 0.002** 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001* -0.002**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
arch(1) 0.514*** 0.537*** 0.455*** 0.465*** 0.304*** 0.285*** 0.221*** 0.144*** 0.132***
[0.11] [0.16] [0.14] [0.10] [0.06] [0.08] [0.05] [0.03] [0.03]
arch(2) 0.337*** 0.168** 0.111* 0.197*** 0.167*** 0.155*** 0.032 0.159*** 0.102***
[0.07] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03]
arch(3) 0.383*** 0.202** 0.356* 0.300* 0.255** 0.227*** 0.119*** 0.030 0.038*
[0.10] [0.10] [0.21] [0.15] [0.12] [0.07] [0.04] [0.02] [0.02]
arch(4) 0.451*** 0.311*** 0.283** 0.234*** 0.417*** 0.293*** 0.264** 0.090*** 0.125***
[0.12] [0.09] [0.12] [0.08] [0.11] [0.08] [0.12] [0.03] [0.04]
constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
N 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576
R² 0.28 0.41 0.41 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.24
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03
kutt_eonia 0.18 0.31 0.30 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.08 0.05 0.01
RR_Sentiment_LM 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.006** 0.007** 0.007 0.010* 0.006 0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
kutt_eonia 0.091** 0.265* 0.373*** 0.386*** 0.379*** 0.299 0.211* 0.161 -0.006
[0.04] [0.14] [0.12] [0.11] [0.12] [0.22] [0.13] [0.11] [0.11]
RR_Sentiment_Harv 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.005** 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
kutt_eonia 0.092** 0.266* 0.379*** 0.396*** 0.401*** 0.328* 0.233* 0.172 -0.004
[0.04] [0.14] [0.11] [0.11] [0.14] [0.20] [0.12] [0.11] [0.10]
R² and Partial R² - Variance decomposition on statement days
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equations
(6) and (7) for a different horizon. R² and partial R² are computed from OLS estimates. Controls and ARCH terms
for the LM and Harvard regressions have been removed for space constraints and are available upon request.
Mean equation
Variance equation
AB dictionary
LM dictionary
Harvard dictionary
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Table 5–B. Benchmark FOMC model 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
oiusd1m oiusd3m oiusd6m oiusd9m oiusd1y oiusd2y oiusd3y oiusd5y oiusd10y
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.005** 0.006** 0.001 0.002 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.025* 0.022 0.012
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
kutt_ffr 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.052*** 0.069*** 0.006 0.020 0.015 -0.051** -0.060**
[0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
vix 0.001** -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.003** 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
r_sp500 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.016***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
oil 0.001*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
ismbs 0.003*** 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.011*** 0.007** 0.005* 0.003 0.002
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
constant -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002* -0.002
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
arch(1) 2.478*** 3.178*** 2.654*** 2.375*** 1.438*** 0.601*** 0.376*** 0.295*** 0.267***
[0.57] [0.69] [0.63] [0.42] [0.24] [0.16] [0.08] [0.06] [0.06]
constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
N 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576
R² 0.19 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.11 0.22 0.18 0.12 0.09
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02
kutt_ffr 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
RR_Sentiment_LM -0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.025*** 0.013 0.004 0.005 0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
kutt_ffr 0.026*** 0.065* 0.052*** 0.072*** 0.026 0.028 0.020 -0.046* -0.057**
[0.00] [0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
RR_Sentiment_Harv 0.009*** 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.033** 0.034* 0.033
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
kutt_ffr 0.023*** 0.066 0.052*** 0.071*** 0.055*** 0.065 0.032* -0.040** -0.046*
[0.01] [0.04] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.06] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
LM dictionary
AB dictionary
Mean equation
Variance equation
R² and Partial R² - Variance decomposition on statement days
Harvard dictionary
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equations
(6) and (7) for a different horizon. R² and partial R² are computed from OLS estimates. Controls and ARCH terms
for the LM and Harvard regressions have been removed for space constraints and are available upon request.
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Table 6–A. Alternative ECB specifications 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
oieur1m oieur3m oieur6m oieur9m oieur1y oieur2y oieur3y oieur5y oieur10y
RR_Sentiment_AB2 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.017** 0.019** 0.013
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.000 0.003* 0.004 0.008** 0.010** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.019** 0.013
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
TT_Sentiment_AB 0.002 0.004** 0.005* 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.015** 0.015** 0.009
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
TT_Sentiment_LM 0.002* 0.003 0.005 0.006** 0.007** 0.008 0.008 0.003 -0.002
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
TT_Sentiment_Harv 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.006** 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.002 0.003* 0.005* 0.008** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.021** 0.013*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB -0.001 0.005 0.003 0.012 0.015** 0.020** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.017**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB -0.002 0.005 0.008 0.012 0.014* 0.018* 0.022** 0.021** 0.017**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB -0.002 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.014* 0.018* 0.021** 0.021** 0.017**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.004* 0.007** 0.010** 0.016*** 0.010 0.005
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.002** 0.005** 0.006** 0.006** 0.008** 0.011* 0.011 0.011 0.011
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.002 0.003* 0.004 0.008** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.021** 0.012*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.001 0.005 0.007* 0.012** 0.014** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.023** 0.016**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB -0.007* 0.005 0.008 0.012* 0.013 0.018 0.019 0.018* 0.011
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB -0.002 0.005* 0.007 0.009* 0.010 0.021** 0.024** 0.024** 0.020**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Pre-FG subsample3
Pre-ELB subsample2
No controls
ARCH(1)
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to
equations (6) and (7) for a different horizon. Controls and ARCH terms have been removed for space constraints
and are available from the authors upon request. 1OLS estimation with 1030 observations. 2Sample of 972
observations ending May 6, 2009. 3Sample of 2057 observations ending July 3, 2013.
Including a lag of the dependent variable
Wednesday and Thursday only1
Taylor rule-type shock identification with LM dictionary
TARCH term
Taylor rule-type shock identification with Harvard dictionary
ΔrE between t+1 and t-1
ΔrE between t and t-2
Alternative computation of Tone based on equation (2)
Taylor rule-type shock identification with AB dictionary
OLS estimation
Including Forward Guidance announcement dummies
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Table 6–B. Alternative FOMC specifications 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
oiusd1m oiusd3m oiusd6m oiusd9m oiusd1y oiusd2y oiusd3y oiusd5y oiusd10y
RR_Sentiment_AB2 0.004 0.009 -0.001 -0.002 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.027 0.018 0.005
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.005** 0.007* 0.001 0.002 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.028** 0.017 0.006
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
RR_Sent_AB_GB 0.005** 0.009* 0.001 0.000 0.043*** 0.049*** 0.042* 0.044 0.032
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
RR_Sent_AB_SK 0.005** 0.006** 0.001 0.002 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.025* 0.021 0.012
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
TT_Sentiment_AB 0.005** 0.007** 0.001 0.003 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.029** 0.029 0.018
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
TT_Sentiment_LM -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.021*** 0.01 0.005 0.007 0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
TT_Sentiment_Harv 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.027*** 0.033*** 0.029 0.029 0.030
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.004** 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.025 0.022 0.013
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.001* 0.003*** 0.001 0.000 0.018*** 0.026** 0.025 0.016 0.004
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.015 0.016 0.012 0.01 0.007 0.014* 0.013 0.013 0.008
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.015 0.017 0.012 0.011 0.01 0.015* 0.014 0.012 0.006
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.000 -0.001 -0.007 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 0.005
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.016*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 0.013** -0.003 -0.011 -0.002 -0.008
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.004** 0.005*** 0.002 0.002 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.027** 0.022 0.013
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
RR_Sentiment_AB -0.001 0.006** 0.001 0.003 0.037*** 0.030*** 0.029** 0.031 0.025
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.011 0.007 0.018 0.010 0.062*** 0.044** 0.042** 0.038* 0.019
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to
equations (6) and (7) for a different horizon. Controls and ARCH terms have been removed for space constraints
and are available from the authors upon request. 1OLS estimation with 1034 observations. 2Sample of 870
observations ending December 15, 2008.
ARCH(2)
OLS estimation
Wednesday and Thursday only1
ΔrE between t+1 and t-1
ΔrE between t and t-2
No controls
Including a lag of the dependent variable
Pre-FG & ELB subsample2
TARCH term
Taylor rule-type shock identification with AB dictionary
Alternative computation of Tone based on equation (2)
Taylor rule-type shock identification with LM dictionary
Taylor rule-type shock identification with Harvard dictionary
Including Forward Guidance announcement dummies
Identification including dispersion and skewness measures for FOMC forecasts
Identification using Greenbook forecasts as instruments for FOMC forecasts
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Table 7–A. State-dependent effects of ECB Sentiment shocks 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
oieur1m oieur3m oieur6m oieur9m oieur1y oieur2y oieur3y oieur5y oieur10y
Interaction -0.006*** -0.005* -0.003 -0.006 -0.008* -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.003 0.004* 0.005* 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.013*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Ambiguity 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
RR_Sentiment_AB coefficient when:
High Ambiguity 0.001 0.003* 0.004 0.007** 0.009** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.021** 0.011
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Low Ambiguity 0.004** 0.005** 0.005* 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.024** 0.015*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Interaction -0.007** 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.011 0.017 0.002 0.004
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.007** 0.010* 0.015* 0.016 0.003
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Sign 0.003*** 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.002 -0.004 0.006 0.010
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB coefficient when:
Positive ξ t -0.004** 0.003 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.021 0.032* 0.018 0.007
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Negative ξ t 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.007** 0.010* 0.015* 0.016 0.003
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Interaction -0.002* 0.002* 0.003** 0.004* 0.004 0.006** 0.005 0.004 0.007
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.002 0.004* 0.005** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.021** 0.012*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB coefficient when:
Big shocks 0.002 0.004** 0.005** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.021** 0.013*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Small shocks 0.002 0.003* 0.004* 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.020** 0.011
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Interaction 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 0.008 0.007 -0.008 -0.006
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.009** 0.012*** 0.015** 0.020** 0.022** 0.014*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
CEPR 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Interaction -0.002 0.000 0.006** 0.005 0.005 0.013** 0.010 0.010 0.010
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.002 0.003* 0.006** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.024** 0.015*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
CPI 0.000 0.002 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.000 0.000 0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
RR_Sentiment_AB coefficient when:
High inflation 0.000 0.004 0.012*** 0.015** 0.018** 0.034*** 0.033** 0.033** 0.025*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
Low inflation 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.007** 0.009** 0.014* 0.014* 0.005
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Interaction -0.004** -0.006** -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.009** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.012*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
kutt_eonia 0.002*** 0.005** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004* 0.003* 0.002 0.000
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
RR_Sentiment_AB coefficient when:
Δ+ kutt_eonia -0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.005 0.008** 0.015** 0.021*** 0.019** 0.012
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Δ- kutt_eonia 0.005*** 0.010* 0.008 0.014* 0.014** 0.018* 0.021** 0.022** 0.013
[0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to
equations (6) and (7) for a different horizon, augmented with the relevant interaction term. Controls and ARCH
terms have been removed for space constraints and are available from the authors upon request. We compute the
coefficient of the sentiment variable while setting the state variable at either a high (mean + 1 S.D.) or a low value
(mean - 1 S.D.) to interpret interacted effects with continuous variables. This makes the results easier to interpret
than with the interaction term that gives information when the interacted variables are at their average values.
Ambiguity
Monetary shocks
CPI
Size (RR_Sentiment_AB squared)
CEPR recession dummy
Sign
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Table 7–B. State-dependent effects of FOMC Sentiment shocks 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
oiusd1m oiusd3m oiusd6m oiusd9m oiusd1y oiusd2y oiusd3y oiusd5y oiusd10y
Interaction -0.018*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.007 -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.024 -0.025 -0.022
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.016 0.014 0.005
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Ambiguity -0.001 0.003 -0.003** 0.000 0.006 0.013 0.009 0.002 -0.004
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB coefficient when:
High Ambiguity 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.002 0.006 0.012** 0.012 0.010 0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Low Ambiguity 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.004 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.021** 0.019 0.009
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Interaction -0.009 -0.015 0.001 -0.005 -0.045*** -0.055** -0.047 0.007 0.022
[0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.009 0.018 0.002 0.006 0.038*** 0.041** 0.032 0.025 0.008
[0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Sign 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.006 0.005 -0.012 -0.013
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.04] [0.03]
RR_Sentiment_AB coefficient when:
Positive ξ t 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.000 -0.006 -0.013 -0.015 0.032 0.030
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.05] [0.03]
Negative ξ t 0.009 0.018 0.002 0.006* 0.038*** 0.041** 0.032* 0.025 0.008
[0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Interaction -0.002 -0.005 0.000 -0.002 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013** -0.007 0.002
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.022*** 0.019 0.013 0.017 0.012
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
RR_Sentiment_AB coefficient when:
Big shocks 0.005* 0.007* 0.001 0.002 0.021*** 0.017 0.012 0.016 0.013
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
Small shocks 0.006* 0.009* 0.001 0.003 0.024*** 0.021* 0.015 0.018 0.012
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
Interaction -0.003 0.007** -0.006 -0.007 -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.045 -0.043 -0.019
[0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.06] [0.06]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.030** 0.027 0.015
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
NBER 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.002 0.006** 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
RR_Sentiment_AB coefficient when:
Expansion 0.005* 0.002* 0.002 0.003 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.030** 0.027 0.015
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
Recession 0.002 0.009 -0.004 -0.004 -0.024*** -0.022 -0.015 -0.016 -0.004
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.06] [0.05]
Interaction 0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.003** 0.019*** 0.019** 0.019** 0.015 0.006
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.004 0.006 0.005** 0.002 0.017*** 0.024** 0.016 0.017 0.011
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
CPI -0.001** 0.001 -0.003*** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
RR_Sentiment_AB coefficient when:
High inflation 0.008* 0.011 0.004 0.005* 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.035** 0.032** 0.017
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
Low inflation 0.000 0.002 0.007** -0.001 -0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.005
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.03]
Interaction -0.007*** -0.014*** -0.006*** -0.005 -0.015*** -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
RR_Sentiment_AB 0.002 0.004*** 0.001 0.002 -0.021*** 0.022 0.022 0.019 0.008
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
kutt_ffr -0.001** -0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.005** -0.003 0.000 -0.005 -0.006
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
RR_Sentiment_AB coefficient when:
Δ+ kutt_ffr -0.004** -0.010** -0.004*** -0.003 -0.035*** 0.015 0.020 0.017 0.006
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Δ- kutt_ffr 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.008*** 0.007 -0.006 0.030*** 0.024* 0.021 0.011
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
Monetary shocks
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to
equations (6) and (7) for a different horizon, augmented with the relevant interaction term. Controls and ARCH
terms have been removed for space constraints and are available from the authors upon request. We compute the
coefficient of the sentiment variable while setting the state variable at either a high (mean + 1 S.D.) or a low value
(mean - 1 S.D.) to interpret interacted effects with continuous variables. This makes the results easier to interpret
than with the interaction term that gives information when the interacted variables are at their average values.
Size (RR_Sentiment_AB squared)
Ambiguity
NBER recession dummy
CPI
Sign
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A. Dictionary word lists 
 
  
Positive words Negative words
25 26
354 2349
1915 2291
increas* decreas* 
accelerat* decelerat* 
fast* slow* 
strong* weak* 
high* low* 
gain* loss* 
expand* contract* 
improve crucial
improvement decline
positive imbalances
progress negative
greater questions
stability challenges
strengthen dampened
strengthening concerns
strong volatility
stronger weak
Most illustrative tokens
Most frequent in statements
Apel and Blix-Grimaldi (2012)
Loughran and McDonald (2011)
General Inquirer’s Harvard dictionary
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Table B. Data description 
 
 
  
Abbreviation Description Source Frequency
oieur1m Euro 1 month OIS Datastream Daily
oieur3m Euro 3 month OIS Datastream Daily
oieur6m Euro 6 month OIS Datastream Daily
oieur9m Euro 9 month OIS Datastream Daily
oieur1y Euro 1 year OIS Datastream Daily
oieur2y Euro 2 year OIS Datastream Daily
oieur3y Euro 3 year OIS Datastream Daily
oieur5y Euro 5 year OIS Datastream Daily
oieur10 Euro 10 year OIS Datastream Daily
Tone_AB Apel and Blix-Grimaldi (2012) Authors’ computations For each ECB statement
Tone_LM Loughran and McDonald (2011) Authors’ computations For each ECB statement
Tone_Harv  Harvard dictionary Authors’ computations For each ECB statement
ambiguity Loughran and McDonald (2011) Authors’ computations For each ECB statement
eonia Eonia Datastream Daily
shadow Shadow rate Wu and Xia (2016) Monthly 
cpi CPI inflation rate (year-over-year %) Eurostat Monthly
gdp Real GDP growth (year-over-year %) Eurostat Quarterly
ciss Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress ECB Weekly
esi Economics Sentiment Indicator European Commission Monthly
oil WTI oil price growth (year-over-year %) Datastream Daily
r_euro50 Eurostoxx 50 price index Datastream Daily
ecb_cpi_*
ECB/Eurosystem staff inflation projections 
for current and next calendar years
ECB Quarterly
ecb_gdp_*
ECB/Eurosystem staff output projections 
for current and next calendar years
ECB Quarterly
SPF_*
Survey of Professional Forecasters' 
inflation forecasts for 1, 2 and 5 years 
ECB Quarterly
oiusd1m US 1 month OIS Datastream Daily
oiusd3m US 3 month OIS Datastream Daily
oiusd6m US 6 month OIS Datastream Daily
oiusd9m US 9 month OIS Datastream Daily
oiusd1y US 1 year OIS Datastream Daily
oiusd2y US 2 year OIS Datastream Daily
oiusd3y US 3 year OIS Datastream Daily
oiusd5y US 5 year OIS Datastream Daily
oiusd10 US 10 year OIS Datastream Daily
Tone_AB Apel and Blix-Grimaldi (2012) Authors’ computations For each FOMC statement
Tone_LM Loughran and McDonald (2011) Authors’ computations For each FOMC statement
Tone_Harv  Harvard dictionary Authors’ computations For each FOMC statement
Ambiguity Loughran and McDonald (2011) Authors’ computations For each FOMC statement
ffr Effective Federal Funds Rate Datastream Daily
shadow Shadow rate Wu and Xia (2016) Monthly 
cpi CPI inflation rate (year-over-year %) Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly
gdp Real GDP growth (year-over-year %) Bureau of Economic Analysis Quarterly
vix Volatility Index of the CBOE Datastream Daily
ismbs ISM Report on Business Survey Index Datastream Monthly
oil WTI oil price growth (year-over-year %) Datastream Daily
r_sp500 Standard & Poor's 500 price index Datastream Daily
fomc_cpi_*
FOMC inflation projections for current and 
next calendar years
Federal Reserve Quarterly
fomc_gdp_*
FOMC output projections for current and 
next calendar years
Federal Reserve Quarterly
SPF_*
Survey of Professional Forecasters' 
inflation forecasts for Q+1, Q+4 and 5 years 
Federal Reserve Quarterly
United States
Euro Area
Note: Weekly, monthly and quarterly data have been constant-interpolated to daily frequency so as to respect the information
structure.
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Figure A. Central Bank Sentiment shocks using LM and Harvard dictionaries 
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Figure B. Distribution of Central Bank Sentiment shocks  
using LM and Harvard dictionaries 
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